Foreign Policy of Russia as a Tool for the Formation of the Russian National Identity

Abstract

A phenomenon of Russian political evolution since the second half of the 2000s has been the large-scale expansion of the discourse of national identity into foreign policy rhetoric. The most important feature of the official Russian foreign policy discourse has become the politicization and elevation to the rank of issues of national security. Foreign policy is becoming a tool for constructing a national identity for the Russian elite. In relations with countries where issues of Russian identity are not so important (the countries of Asia and the Middle East), pragmatism allows Russian foreign policy to succeed. In relations with Western countries and neighbors in the post-Soviet space, the mythology that constructs national identity conflicts with pragmatism. In July 2021, an essential long-term strategic planning document, the new National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, was approved by presidential decree. Reflecting the prevailing mood in the Kremlin and, more broadly, in the Russian elite, the document proceeds from the fact that the confrontation between Russia and the West has taken on a protracted and long-term character. On this issue, an almost complete consensus has been reached in Moscow, not only in the state apparatus but also in the expert community. However, the answers to why this happened and how to get out of this situation may be different - and there is no consensus here. According to the Liberalism theory of International Relations, Russia's confrontation against the West is explained by the clash between democratic and authoritarian regimes. In the logic of the liberal theory of international relations, the future democratization of Russia will end the confrontation. Within the framework of this approach, it is not easy to find answers to how to reconcile the interests of Russia and the United States in Euro-Atlantic security, the role of NATO and its expansion, and processes in the post-Soviet space. The democratization of the electoral process, the turnover of power, the strengthening of civil society, the establishment of effective laws and practices in the field of property, and the reduction of corruption in Russia do not necessarily preclude the continuation of severe disagreements with the United States over the principles that form the new international system. The second approach is a theory of realism, a traditional view of the science and practice of international relations, emphasizing the struggle for survival, national interests, and competition. With difficulty explaining the changes in the behavior of states in the international arena that occur for domestic political reasons, this approach assumes that the great powers are doomed to eternal competition, which inevitably develops into confrontation and even confrontation in specific historical periods. The third approach to international relations—constructivism—may significantly supplement the analysis of relations between Russia and the West from the "liberal" and "realistic" perspectives. Both approaches are necessary but not sufficient to explain the causes of the modern confrontation between Russia and Western countries. Each of them highlights crucial aspects of the problem, but some questions still need to be answered. Russia's interactions with the US and European countries can be understood not as relationships between nation-states and their alliances, differing in terms of types of political systems or military strength, but as a meeting of subjects with strikingly different perceptions of themselves and the world. The level of democratization (the "liberal" approach) or "power and influence" (the "realist" approach) are not adequate measures of these differences. An approach based on the study of differences in collective identities can provide a useful analytical tool for studying the interaction between Russia and the West. This paper aims to study how the Russian political elite perceives relations with the West and Post Soviet states and how Kremlin uses national myths created or approved by the state as the only source of collective memory. Which basic historical myths Russia uses in the Russian National Identity issue discourse and how these myths construct Russian Foreign policy and influence Kremlin's relations with the West and Post Soviet States.